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This paper shows how the internal job market for participants in the IMF’s Econ-
omist Program (EPs) could be redesigned to eliminate most of the shortcomings
of the current system. The new design is based on Gale and Shapley’s (1962)
deferred acceptance algorithm and generates an efficient and stable outcome. An
Excel-based computer program, EP-Match, implements the algorithm and ap-
plies it to the internal job market for EPs. The program can be downloaded from
http://www.people.hbs.edu/gbarron/EP-Match_ for_Excel.htm. [JEL C78, D73]
T
he Economist Program is the gate of entry into the IMF for young economists
joining the Fund soon after graduate school. Each year, 35 to 45 participants,
usually referred to as “EPs,” join the program for a two-year period. During this
time, EPs work in two different IMF departments. After graduating from the Pro-
gram, EPs are considered for permanent staff positions.
In the context of the Economist Program, each EP is matched to a department
on three occasions. First, upon joining the IMF in June or October; then, upon trans-
fer to a second-year position one year later; and, finally, when the EP is assigned to
a permanent position at the end of the program.
Matching of EPs to second-year assignments and permanent positions takes
place through a decentralized, internal job market system. Matching of incoming
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EPs to first-year positions is done centrally by the IMF’s Human Resources Dep-
artment (HRD).
This paper argues that the procedures currently in place exhibit structural short-
comings. It proposes an alternative centralized matching mechanism, based on Gale
and Shapley’s (1962) deferred acceptance algorithm (DAA), that resolves most of
these shortcomings. Finally, it introduces EP-Match, an Excel-based computer pro-
gram that implements the DAA and applies it to the internal job market for EPs.
I. The Current Situation
Decentralized Matching of Transferring and Graduating EPs
Transferring and graduating EPs are matched to second-year assignments and per-
manent positions through a decentralized job market system. However, to promote
equality of opportunities, and to prevent unraveling of the market,1 departments
and EPs are supposed to abide by strict rules as to when they can first contact each
other and when they can start making and accepting job offers.
In terms of Roth and Xing’s (1994) taxonomy of entry-level labor markets, the
internal job market for transferring and graduating EPs is in “Stage 2.” Here,
“Stage 1” refers to an entirely unregulated job market, while “Stage 3” refers to a
fully centralized market. Their detailed description of the symptoms of a typical
Stage 2 market is so recognizable that we quote it here at some length.
In stage 2, a . . . market organization . . . attempts to establish a uniform
date before which offers should not be made, and often an earlier date
before which interviews should not be conducted, and a later date (or time)
before which candidates who have received offers should not be required
to respond. Sometimes this is hardly successful at all, with many market
participants ignoring or circumventing the rules, and those who obey them
quickly finding that this puts them at a disadvantage. And even when uni-
form dates are successfully established and maintained, the market often
experiences a great deal of congestion and chaotic behavior, as the dead-
lines for accepting or rejecting offers grows near. A firm is eager to know
if its offers will be accepted in time, so that if it has unfilled positions it may
approach its most preferred alternative candidates before they have had to
accept any offers they have received. And candidates who have received
offers, but not from their first choice firm, are intent upon waiting until the
last allowable moment before accepting any offer, in the hope of receiving
a better one. Particularly if, as often seems to be the case, some fraction of
candidates holds on to multiple offers as the final deadline approaches, this
means that just before the deadline expires many transactions still remain
to be made. Firms whose first choice candidates reject them may now
1By “unraveling” we mean the phenomenon, common in entry-level labor markets, of employers mak-
ing job offers earlier from year to year. This is done in an effort to preempt the competition and recruit the
best candidates. Once unraveling has started, it is hard to stop and often spins out of control. In the market
for federal appellate law clerks, for example, job offers have recently been made almost two years in
advance of employment (see Avery and others, 2001). The same holds for entry-level gastroenterology posi-
tions for medical doctors. Interviews for these positions now take place even before students have had the
opportunity to explore other subspecialties (see Niederle and Roth, 2003). In markets that experience unrav-
eling, applicants typically receive “exploding” offers that must be accepted or rejected on short notice.Greg Barron and Felix Várdy
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find that their next dozen candidates have already accepted offers, and can-
didates may receive preferred offers moments after making a verbal
commitment to accept an earlier offer. In some markets such verbal com-
mitments are virtually always honored, and in others they are sometimes
reneged on. In either event, in the aftermath, many firms and candidates
have just missed making connections they would have preferred. The
result is that the following year witnesses a resurgence of strategic behav-
iors designed to avoid being caught short at the end of the market. Often
new rules are formulated to prohibit the more brazen of these, and new
adaptations are made. While some markets have persisted for many sea-
sons in this fashion, systems of formalized dates are often abandoned, with
the market either reverting to stage 1 [an unregulated market], or moving
on to stage 3 [a centralized market].” (Roth and Xing, 1994, p. 996.)
From personal experience, one of the authors can attest that the internal job mar-
ket for transferring and graduating EPs exhibits virtually all the symptoms de-
scribed by Roth and Xing. Specifically,
•T he IMF’s Human Resources Department tries to prevent unraveling by en-
forcing rules on market timing; for example, timing of first contact, interview-
ing, making, and accepting offers.
•D epartments and EPs routinely try to circumvent these rules, while those par-
ticipants who do obey the rules often end up with rather unfavorable outcomes.
A prime example is the rule that EPs and departments should not contact each
other before a certain date. This rule is clearly unenforceable.
•W hen a department makes a job offer to an EP, it often pressures the EP to
accept or reject the offer on the spot, or on very short notice.
• Conversely, if EPs can get away with it, they often try to postpone a deci-
sion on a particular offer until the very last moment, in the hope of receiv-
ing a better offer.
• Sometimes, the hoarding of multiple offers by a few sought-after EPs leads to
a virtual standstill in the market. And once these EPs have made up their minds,
a flurry of offers and acceptances takes place in a very short time period. (This
kind of “congestion” is studied extensively in Roth and Xing, 1997.)
• In response to continuous complaints, HRD has modified the rules governing
the market numerous times, apparently without much success.
In addition to the symptoms mentioned by Roth and Xing (1994), it has been
noted that
•T he current system hurts EPs who are traveling—or prevents departments
from sending EPs on business trips during the job market period—because of
the limited time frame in which EPs and departments are allowed to interact.
•T he current system creates a lot of stress and anxiety among EPs, because they
consider the process to be rather unpredictable and not particularly fair.
Centralized Matching of Incoming EPs
HRD matches incoming EPs to departments on the basis of EPs’and departments’
preferences. These preferences are solicited in the form of rank-order lists (ROLs).
Participants who do not respond are assumed to be indifferent.The process by which HRD translates participants’ preferences into a match
of EPs and departments is heuristic. This means that HRD tries to find the “best”
fit without formulating an explicit objective function or a procedure to resolve
conflicting preferences. The drawback of a heuristic approach is that the resulting
match is not guaranteed to be Pareto efficient and/or stable.2 Indeed, we show in
the Appendix that, for a recent cohort of incoming EPs for which we were able to
obtain the necessary data, HRD’s match was in fact neither.
Motivated by the shortcomings of the matching systems currently in place, in
the next section, we discuss Gale and Shapley’s deferred acceptance algorithm.
II. The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
Preliminaries
The internal job market for EPs can be viewed as a “College Admissions Problem”
(CAP). The CAP is concerned with two disjoint groups, which we shall refer to as
EPs and departments, that have to be matched to each other while taking into
account their mutual preferences. The CAP was first formulated by David Gale and
Lloyd Shapley in a pathbreaking paper in the American Mathematical Monthly
(Gale and Shapley, 1962).
Gale and Shapley (GS) argue that a match of EPs and departments, denoted by
m, solves the CAP only if it is stable; that is, only if there is no (EP, department) pair
that would prefer to be matched to each other over sticking to their matches as pre-
scribed by m. Obviously, a matching process that violates this property can easily be
upset by an EP and a department getting together in a manner that benefits both. Such
an (EP, department) pair is called a “blocking pair.” The empirical literature indeed
confirms that stability is a very important property in the design of a matching mar-
ket to fix unraveling and associated Stage 2 market failures (see Table 1, p. 417).
GS prove that, for the CAP, a stable match always exists.3 Although there may
be multiple stable matches for a given preference profile, when preferences are
strict, the set of positions filled and EPs employed are the same in all stable matches
(Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). Another attractive feature of stability in the CAP is
that it implies Pareto efficiency.4 The reverse, however, is not true; that is, typi-
cally, there are many Pareto-efficient matches that are unstable. Thus, stability is
a strictly stronger requirement than Pareto efficiency.
In their original paper, GS also provide an iterative procedure for finding a sta-
ble match with respect to the participants’ stated preferences. This procedure is
called the deferred acceptance algorithm. Currently, (a variant of) the DAA is used
2A formal definition of stability is given in the next section.
3This result is far from trivial, as is illustrated by the closely related “Roommates Problem.” In the
Roommates Problem, an even number of boys has to be paired up. GS show that, in this case, a stable
matching may not exist. Instead, cycles of blocking pairs may cause the set of stable matches to be empty:
Consider four boys, A, B, C, and D. Let A rank B first (i.e., B is A’s most preferred roommate), while B
ranks C first, and C ranks A first. At the same time, A, B, and C all rank D last. Then, regardless of D’s
preferences, there can be no stable matching; whoever is matched to D will want to move out, and one of
the other two will be willing to take him in.
4This follows from the fact that, under strict and “responsive” preferences, bilateral stability implies
group stability, and vice versa. See Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
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to match applicants and employers in virtually all medical and dental residency
programs, pharmacy practices, and psychology internships, both in the United
States and Canada (see, e.g., www.nrmp.org).5
The Algorithm
The DAA is best illustrated in a simplified environment in which each department
has exactly one vacancy and the total number of vacancies is equal to the total num-
ber of EPs. This simple setup is known in the literature as the “marriage problem.”
Subsequently, we can modify the DAA to handle the general case with an arbitrary
number of departments, vacancies per department, and EPs.
It should be noted that, under the DAA, EPs and departments continue to
make initial contact and arrange interviews in a decentralized manner. But in the
end, instead of making offers directly, participants submit ROLs to the market
maker, HRD, which then runs the DAA. The output of the DAA is a stable match;
that is, a stable allocation of EPs across departments.
For ease of exposition, we describe the algorithm as if offers and rejections in
the DAA are made by the departments and EPs. In reality, it is the market maker that
makes these decisions for them, based on the ROLs submitted by the participants.
For the simple case (marriage problem), the DAA works as follows:
Round 0: EPs and departments rank one another in order of attractiveness.
Round 1: Each department makes a job offer to its top-ranked EP. An EP who
receives one or more job offers rejects all but the most preferred among the
offers received. The relatively most preferred job offer is kept on hold.
Round i (i ≥ 2): A department that was rejected in the previous round makes an
offer to its top-ranked EP among those who have not yet rejected it. An EP who
receives new offers rejects all but the most preferred among the new offers re-
ceived and the offer kept on hold from the previous round. Again, the relatively
most preferred offer is kept on hold.
Stop: The algorithm terminates when no new job offers are made. At that point
each EP has exactly one offer and accepts it.
Note that the roles of EPs and departments in the DAA can be reversed, such that
it is the EPs who make the offers to the departments. While both procedures lead to
a stable match, the outcomes are not necessarily identical. In fact, Gale and Shapley
show that the DAA-generated stable match is preferred over all other stable matches
by the side making the offers, provided that preferences are strict.
The extension of the DAA to the general case is now straightforward. With k
departments each having a quota of qi positions, n EPs, and EPs making the offers,
the algorithm proceeds as follows. First, all EPs apply to the department of their
first choice. Department i, with qi positions, then places on its waiting list the qi EPs
it likes best, or all applying EPs if there are fewer than qi. It rejects the rest. Rejected
EPs then apply to the department of their second choice. Again, each department
selects the top qi among the new applicants and those on the waiting list, puts these
5The variant used is the Roth and Peranson (1999) algorithm. Its advantage over the standard DAA is
that it can handle couples applying together.on its new waiting list and rejects the rest. The procedure terminates when all EPs
either are on a waiting list or have been rejected by every department to which they
were willing to apply. At this point, each department accepts the offers from every-
one on its waiting list and the EP-optimal stable match has been achieved.
Though we have implicitly assumed that all departments rank all EPs (and vice
versa), in practice this is not really necessary. Instead, for each of its positions, a
department should rank sufficient EPs to be reasonably assured of at least one EP
accepting the job.6 This implies that the effort spent on interviewing and ranking
EPs under the DAA will not differ much from the effort expended under the cur-
rent system. Also in the current system, a department will want to avoid a situation
in which, as a result of too many rejections, it has to start interviewing additional
EPs after the market has opened and offers have been made, because, by then, very
few EPs will be left to choose from.
Finally, rankings do not have to be strict. Indifference between some or all
counterparts is allowed and is resolved by randomization.7 Moreover, departments
can classify certain EPs as unacceptable, and EPs can do the same for depart-
ments. We will get back to these issues later.
Strategic Issues
Strategy-proofness
Roth (1982) proves that there is no stable matching mechanism, including the
DAA, that is 100 percent strategy-proof. Even in the case of the DAA, it is possi-
ble to cook up a constellation of preferences such that at least one participant
would gain by distorting them.
The catch is that strategic misrepresentation tends to require much more infor-
mation about other participants’ preferences than is usually available. Roth and
Rothblum (1999) show that when participants in the DAA are sufficiently uncertain
about the preferences of others, they cannot gain by reversing the order of their true
preferences. However, if toward the bottom of the ROL a participant is close to
indifferent between being matched or not, and the other side makes the offers, a
participant might gain by shortening the ROL, falsely claiming that the least pre-
ferred options are “unacceptable.” In practice, however, such a strategy is unlikely
to be used much, because of its high risk: it might mean that an EP or department
ends up with no match at all.
In any case, truncation clearly is not an option for EPs, unless they are pre-
pared to quit and leave the IMF. For departments, truncation is possible only in the
market for permanent positions, since, at the end of the day, all transferring EPs
have to be matched to a department.
6For example, in the National Resident Matching Program, each employer interviews and ranks only
a tiny fraction of all potential candidates. This does not interfere with the workings of the DAA.
7When a large number of participants on both sides of the market are indifferent between many counter-
parts, a complication may arise. For example, suppose that some EPs and some departments do not care who
they are matched to, or have not submitted an ROL. In that case, the DAA proceeds with randomly gener-
ated (strict) preferences. What if on the basis of these randomly generated preferences, an indifferent EP
and an indifferent department end up matched to each other? Obviously, neither of them can or will 
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Roth and Rothblum’s result of “almost-strategy-proofness in practice” goes a
long way in explaining the popularity and robustness of the DAA in real-world
applications such as the National Residency Matching Program for physicians.
Indeed, Roth (1984a, 1990, 1991) and Roth and Xing (1994) show that, with very
few exceptions, centralized matching mechanisms survive if, and only if, they pro-
duce stable matches with respect to the participants’ (stated) preferences. This is
illustrated in Table 1, taken from Roth and Rothblum (1999).
The DAA and the pressure to precommit
In the current system, departments and EPs routinely flout the rules by commit-
ting to one another before the official opening of the market. This raises the ques-
tion of whether the situation would be any different under the DAA. Specifically,
what prevents departments and EPs from reducing the DAA to a mere formality
by precommitting to top-rank one another?
In the current system, rejection of an offer in the official market is potentially
very costly for a department. The reason is that a rejected department may find that
all other attractive EPs have already accepted offers from other departments. To
mitigate this risk, departments routinely put extreme pressure on EPs to precom-
mit to accepting a forthcoming job offer. By contrast, rejections are costless in the
DAA (at least, from a strategic perspective). The reason is that all acceptances and
rejections occur simultaneously. Therefore, a department has no particular interest in
making sure that its job offer is accepted by the first EP it is offered to. Indeed, the
zero rejection cost in the DAA implies that a department can and should top-rank its
favorite EP even if the probability of the EP accepting the offer is very small. In turn,
this undermines the credibility of the exploding nature of a pre-market offer, since
the department will top-rank its favorite EP, even if the EP refuses to precommit.
These considerations explain why, over time, unraveling and precommitment
tend to occur less under the DAA than in decentralized markets. Nevertheless, it
is true that precommitment might still occur on a smaller scale, particularly with
repeated interaction. In this context, Niederle and Roth (2004b) stress the impor-
tance of “market culture,” such as norms governing exploding offers.
Departments or positions?
So far, we have assumed that EPs rank, and are matched to, departments. Usually,
however, EPs do not have preferences for departments as such, but for specific
positions within departments. For example, even though an EP’s first choice might
be to work on the China desk in the Asia and Pacific Department (APD), the EP
might very well prefer working on South Africa in the African Department over
working on Tuvalu in APD. In this case, APD can do two things: either list the
object to that. However, there may be other, non-indifferent EPs or departments that would very much like
to be matched to one of these indifferent participants. In that case, we might be able to accommodate one
of them without hurting anybody else. In other words, when the randomization is such that indifferent par-
ticipants end up matched to each other, the matching may not be strictly Pareto optimal. In that case, we
should either redo the DAA with newly generated random preferences or manually modify the matching to
restore strict Pareto optimality. See the Appendix for a real-world example.China and Tuvalu jobs separately, thereby allowing EPs to express interest specif-
ically in China or specifically in Tuvalu, or lump both jobs together, allowing only
for expressions of interest in working for APD, without formal assurance of being
assigned to any particular job.
When EPs have preferences for particular positions instead of for departments,
there is a trade-off between ex-ante clarity for EPs and ex-post flexibility for dep-
artments. If a department chooses to specify its vacancies in great detail, it lowers
the risk and/or ambiguity for the applicants. In turn, this may help the department
attract better EPs. On the other hand, if a department chooses to be less specific,
it retains full flexibility to assign EPs to one job or another, depending on the need
of the moment.
Presumably, competition will force all but the most popular departments to list
their vacancies separately. From a transparency perspective, separate listings are
indeed preferable.
Summary
The DAA solves many of the problems commonly encountered in matching mar-
kets. In the DAA, all final acceptances occur simultaneously. This eliminates pre-
mature decisions based on incomplete information. Also, undesirable phenomena
such as unraveling, hoarding of multiple offers, and reneging on a prior acceptance
will no longer occur. At the same time, it eliminates the need to impose rules on
THE INTERNAL JOB MARKET OF THE IMF’S ECONOMIST PROGRAM
417
Table 1. Stable and Unstable Centralized Matching Mechanisms
Market Stable DAA Still in use
Entry level medical markets YY Y
US (NRMP) Y Y Y
Edinburgh (’69) Y Y Y
Cardiff Y Y Y
Canada Y Y Y
Cambridge N N Y
London Hospital N N Y
Birmingham N N N
Edinburgh (’67) N N N
Newcastle N N N
Sheffield Y Y Y
Other markets
Medical specialties Y Y Y
Canadian lawyers
Toronto Y Y Y
Vancouver Y Y N
Calgary and Edmonton Y Y Y
Dental residencies Y Y Y
Pharmacists Y Y Y
Sororities Y (at equilibrium) N Y
Source: Roth and Rothblum, 1999. 
Figure 1. Instructions
Greg Barron and Felix Várdy
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the participants that are hard to enforce. In particular, EPs and departments can
communicate with one another as early and as often as they wish. The only hard
constraint is that participants must hand in their rankings of one another on a pre-
announced date. The submitted ROLs then determine the matching of EPs to
departments (or positions) through application of the DAA. Operationally, a mar-
ket maker running the algorithm can execute all steps of the DAA in real time, one
after the other, provided that EPs and departments have handed in their ROLs. This
eliminates the need for repeated communication between EPs and departments, and
thereby the need for EPs to be in Washington during any particular time period.
III. The Computer Program
Description
To facilitate implementation of the DAA at the IMF, we have developed an Excel-
based computer program, called EP-Match, that executes the algorithm and applies
it to the IMF’s internal job market for EPs. The user interface of the program con-
sists of four spreadsheets:
1. Instructions (see Figure 1);
2. Departments’ Preferences (see Figure 2);THE INTERNAL JOB MARKET OF THE IMF’S ECONOMIST PROGRAM
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Figure 2. Departments’ Preferences
3. EPs’ Preferences (see Figure 3);
4. Match (see Figure 4).
To find the stable match generated by the DAA, the user, that is, the market maker,
sequentially works through the four spreadsheets. The first spreadsheet gives
instructions on how to use the program and requires the market maker to enter the
number of EPs and the number of departments (or positions) participating in the
matching process. Here, the market maker must also choose between the EP-
proposing and department-proposing variant of the DAA. In the second spread-
sheet, the market maker specifies the number of vacancies in each department and
enters the departments’ROLs in a matrix. The EPs’ROLs go into the third spread-
sheet. The fourth and last spreadsheet presents the resulting stable match.
The program is quite versatile. First, it allows for an arbitrary number of EPs,
departments, and positions per department. Second, departments are allowed to be 
Figure 3. EPs’ Preferences
Figure 4. The Match
Greg Barron and Felix Várdy
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This means, for example, that D1 likes EP3 best, EP1 second best, and so on.
Similarly, the EPs’ ROLs are as follows:
This means, for example, that EP4 prefers the departments in order D3, D1, D2.
indifferent concerning EPs, and EPs concerning positions. Third, a department can
be assured that it will not be matched to an EP it finds unacceptable by not rank-
ing that EP at all. Of course, it should only do this if it prefers leaving the position
unfilled to hiring that EP. In principle, EPs can do the same with departments they
do not want to join under any circumstances.
Finally, the program can also handle the following, slightly more complex, sit-
uation. Suppose department Dx has multiple positions open, but its ranking of EPs
is not the same for all positions. This might happen if a certain position requires
particular skills, such as fluency in a foreign language or financial expertise. In
that case, we partition the set of Dx’s positions into r disjoint subsets S1, ...,Sr,
such that, for all positions in a particular subset, Dx’s ranking of EPs is in fact the
same. Then department Dx is replaced by multiple “virtual departments” Dx1, ...,
Dxr, such that Dxi offers positions Si and ranks the EPs accordingly. Finally, the
program is run on the modified matching problem.
Examples
The following two examples illustrate how EP-Match works in practice.
Example 1
There are three departments, D1, D2, and D3, and six EPs, EP1–EP6. Each depart-
ment has two vacancies. Let the departments’ ROLs be as follows:
Departments’ Rankings of EPs 
D1 D2 D3 
1
st  EP3 EP1 EP3 
2
nd  EP1 EP3 EP1 
3
rd  EP4 EP4 EP4 
4
th  EP6 EP5 EP2 
5
th  EP2 EP2 EP6 
6
th  EP5 EP6 EP5 
EPs’ Rankings of Departments 
EP1 EP2 EP3 EP4 EP5 EP6 
1
st  D1 D1 D2 D3 D1 D1 
2
nd  D2 D3 D1 D1 D3 D3 
3
rd  D3 D2 D3 D2 D2 D2 Greg Barron and Felix Várdy
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To solve for the associated department-optimal stable match using EP-Match,
the market maker first enters the number of departments (3) and EPs (6) in the
appropriate boxes on the “Instructions” spreadsheet and then checks that the option
“Dept. Proposing” is selected. On the “Departments’Preferences” spreadsheet, the
departments’rankings of the EPs are coded by assigning rank-order “1” to the most-
preferred EP, “2” to the next-most-preferred EP, and so on. On the same spread-
sheet, the number of vacancies (“Positions”) in each department (i.e., 2, 2, 2) is
entered. The departments’preference matrix then looks like the following:
Similarly, on the “EPs’Preferences” spreadsheet, the market maker codes the EPs’
rankings of the departments by assigning rank-order “1” to the most-preferred
department, “2” to the next-most-preferred, and “3” to the least-preferred depart-
ment. The EPs’ preference matrix then looks like this:
Finally, the “Match” button on the “Match” spreadsheet can be pressed, and
the department-optimal stable match appears on screen as follows:
D1 D2 D3
222
EP1 2 1 2
EP2 5 5 4
EP3 1 2 1
EP4 3 3 3
EP5 6 4 6
EP6 4 6 5
Clear All





EP1 D1 D1 EP1
EP2 D3 D1 EP6
EP3 D2 D2 EP3
EP4 D3 D2 EP5
EP5 D2 D3 EP2
EP6 D1 D3 EP4Here, the list on the left is ordered by EP, while the list on the right is ordered by
department.
Note that stability implies that no department will be able to lure a more pre-
ferred EP from another department. Neither can any EP succeed in “stealing” a
more preferred position from another EP.
To calculate the EP-optimal stable match, select the option “EP Proposing” on
the Instructions spreadsheet and press the Match button on the Match spreadsheet.
It is easily verified that, in this example, the EP-optimal and departmental-optimal
stable matches are identical.
Example 2
In our second example we illustrate how EP-Match can be used to solve more
complicated scenarios, when not all EPs are acceptable to all departments, when
there are more (or fewer) positions than EPs, and when departments are indiffer-
ent about some EPs, and EPs are indifferent about some departments.
Let us take the setup of Example 1 as our point of departure but assume that
department D1 is indifferent between EP1 and EP4, and also between EP2 and
EP5. Moreover, department D2 now considers EP2, EP5, and EP6 to be unaccept-
able, while D3 has two additional vacancies (i.e., four instead of two). On the EP
side, EP2, EP4, and EP6 are assumed to be indifferent between the department
they have ranked second and the department they have ranked third. For the rest,
the situation is the same as in Example 1.
In EP-Match, on-screen instructions explain how indifference and unaccept-
ability can be coded into the preference matrices. To express that department Di is
in fact indifferent between EPx and the EP ranked one lower than EPx, add a “*”
to the rank-order number of EPx on the “Departments’ Preferences” spreadsheet.
In our example, this means that D1’s rank-order numbers of EP1 and EP2, that is,
“2” and “5,” respectively, get a “*.” To express that department Di considers EPy
unacceptable, leave cell (EPy, Di) empty. In our example, this means that cells
(EP2, D2), (EP5, D2), and (EP6, D2) remain empty.
The departments’ preference matrix then looks like this:




EP1 2* 1 2
EP2 5* 4
EP3 1 2 1
EP4 3 3 3
EP5 6 6
EP6 4 5
Clear AllGreg Barron and Felix Várdy
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Now, the department-proposing stable match looks like this:
Again, the list on the left is ordered by EP, and the list on the right is ordered by
department.
This stable match differs little from the stable match of Example 1. EP5 has
moved from D2 to D3, filling one of D3’s two additional vacancies, while D2’s
second and D3’s fourth vacancy go unfilled. The latter reflects the fact that, in our
example, there are more positions than EPs. The EP-proposing stable match is
again identical to the department-proposing stable match.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that adopting the deferred acceptance algorithm to
match EPs and departments can enhance the well-being of all parties involved.
Unlike the current system, the DAA generates an efficient and stable outcome by
optimally using all available information on the preferences of the participants as
contained in their rank-order lists. In addition to its attractive theoretical proper-
ties, the DAA has been extensively tried and tested in practice, and has produced
excellent results. To facilitate implementation of the DAA at the IMF, we have
Incorporating EP2’s, EP4’s, and EP6’s indifference between their second- and
third-ranked departments, we get the following EP preference matrix:
EP1 D1 D1 EP1
EP2 D3 D1 EP6
EP3 D2 D2 EP3
EP4 D3 D2 --- not matched ---
EP5 D3 D3 EP2
EP6 D1 D3 EP4
D3 EP5
D3 --- not matched ---
EP1 EP2 EP3 EP4 EP5 EP6
D1 1 1 2 2* 1 1
D2 2 31333
D3 3 2* 3 1 2 2*
Clear Alldeveloped an Excel-based computer program that executes the algorithm on the
basis of EPs’ and departments’ rankings of each other.
APPENDIX
Matching of Incoming EPs
Introduction
As described in Section I, the IMF’s Human Resources Department (HRD) matches incoming
EPs to first-year positions on the basis of EPs’ and departments’ preferences. The question that
arises is whether these matches are stable and/or Pareto efficient. Because HRD tries to find the
“best” fit without formulating an explicit objective function or a procedure to resolve conflicting
preferences, this question can only be answered by looking at actual data.
In this appendix we show that HRD’s match was neither stable nor Pareto efficient in the
case of a cohort of incoming EPs for which we were able to retrieve the necessary data. These
data consist of the participants’preferences, given by their rank-order lists (ROLs) (Table 2), and
the match implemented by HRD (Table 3).8
Methodology
Participants (i.e., departments and EPs) who chose not to submit ROLs are assumed to be in-
different as to who they are matched to. Similarly, participants who ranked only a subset of
counterparts are assumed to be indifferent about those left unranked, while strictly preferring
ranked over unranked counterparts.
To check the stability of HRD’s match, it might be tempting to run EP-Match on the par-
ticipants’ preferences and compare the outcomes. However, this would be misguided, because
the set of stable matches usually contains many elements, while, in principle, EP-Match finds
only two of them; namely, the department-proposing and the EP-proposing stable matches.
Thus, discrepancies between HRD’s match and those calculated by EP-Match are not neces-
sarily informative.
A second complication arises from the large number of declared and imputed “indiffer-
ences” in participants’preferences. Only when preferences are strict does stability imply Pareto
efficiency. Otherwise, stable matches may contain “suspect pairs.” A suspect pair is a match of
an EP and a department, such that both the EP and the department are indifferent between
remaining matched to each other and being matched to someone else. If the EP and/or the
department making up the suspect pair are very sought after among other departments or EPs,
it may be possible to make one or more of these other departments or EPs better off by break-
ing up the suspect pair, without hurting anybody else. This implies that, with a lot of indiffer-
ence on both sides of the market, a stable match is only a candidate solution. To be a
full-fledged solution, it must be established that none of the suspect pairs give rise to Pareto
inefficiencies.
Therefore, a two-step procedure is followed to assess the optimality of HRD’s match with
respect to the participants’ preferences:
• Check the stability of the match by looking for blocking pairs.
• Check whether suspect pairs, if any, give rise to Pareto inefficiencies.
8To protect confidentiality we have made certain changes to the data. In particular, “dummy” EPs,
departments, and preferences have been added. However, the gist of the example and the validity of the
conclusions are fully retained.
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Is HRD’s match stable with respect to the participants’ stated preferences? The answer is no.
To see why, note that EP7 and department D1 form a blocking pair: EP7 strictly prefers D1 to
his current match D5, and D1 strictly prefers EP7 to its current match EP2.
In this case, a simple exchange is sufficient to transform HRD’s match into a stable one.
That is, we reassign EP7 to D1 and EP2 to D5, while keeping everything else the same. Both
EP7 and D5 go from being matched to a counterpart that was not even on their submitted pref-
erence list to being matched to their 1st choice. On the other hand, EP2 goes from his 1st choice
to his 2nd choice, while D5 goes from its 3rd choice to its 6th choice.
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Table 2. Participants’ Preferences
EPs’ Preferences over Departments Departments’ Preferences over EPs
EP participant Preferences1 Department Preferences1
EP1 D12, D11*, D13*, D5*, D1 EP7, EP15, EP17
D7*, D4 D2 EP12, EP7, EP25
EP2 D1, D11*, D13*, D5*, D7*, D3 EP19, EP22*, EP11*, EP16
D12*, D4 D4 EP22, EP19, EP6, EP11, EP12
EP3 No preference indicated D5 EP15, EP21, EP7, EP6, EP19, EP2
EP4 D1, D6, D13, D12 D6 EP15, EP1, EP26
EP5 D12, D11 D7 EP17, EP14, EP25
EP6 No preference indicated D8 No preference indicated
EP7 D1 D9 No preference indicated
EP8 No preference indicated D10 EP9*, EP19
EP9 No preference indicated D11 EP22, EP6, EP19, EP21, EP23, EP7
EP10 No preference indicated D12 No preference indicated
EP11 No preference indicated D13 No preference indicated
EP12 D1, D5, D13 D14 E15, EP24
EP13 No preference indicated
EP14 No preference indicated
1Preferences are listed in rank order.
EP15 D1, D2, D12
*Indicates indifference between EPx and the 
EP16 D1, D3, D10, D13, D5
EP ranked one lower than EPx.
EP17 No preference indicated
EP18 D13, D1
EP19 No preference indicated
EP20 No preference indicated
EP21 D1, D5, D12, D13
EP22 No preference indicated
EP23 D5
EP24 D14, D1
EP25 No preference indicated
EP26 D1, D6, D2
1Preferences are listed in rank order.
*Indicates indifference between 
department Di and the department ranked 
one lower than Di.
Source: IMF’s Human Resources Department.Pareto Efficiency
It is easily established that HRD’s match as given in Table 3 contains the following four sus-
pect pairs: (EP3, D12); (EP10, D13); (EP13, D8); and (EP20, D8). Not all of these suspect pairs
give rise to Pareto inefficiencies, however. Only the first two suspect pairs do. By breaking up
the EP3, D12 pair we can make EP5 strictly better off without hurting anyone else, while break-
ing up EP10, D13 allows us to make EP18 strictly better off.
Specifically, we perform the following Pareto-improving reassignments:
Table 3. Assignments
EPs’ Departmental Assignments Departments’ EP Assignments
EP Assigned department Department Assigned EP
EP1 D6 D1 EP2
EP2 D1 D1 EP15
EP3 D12 D1 EP17
EP4 D4 D2 EP12
EP5 D11 D3 EP16
EP6 D11 D3 EP19
EP7 D5 D4 EP4
EP8 D11 D4 EP11
EP9 D10 D4 EP22
EP10 D13 D5 EP7
EP11 D4 D5 EP21
EP12 D2 D6 EP1
EP13 D8 D6 EP26
EP14 D7 D7 EP14
EP15 D1 D7 EP25
EP16 D3 D8 EP13
EP17 D1 D8 EP20
EP18 D11 D10 EP9
EP19 D3 D11 EP5
EP20 D8 D11 EP6
EP21 D5 D11 EP8
EP22 D4 D11 EP18
EP23 D11 D11 EP23
EP24 D14 D12 EP3
EP25 D7 D13 EP10
EP26 D6 D14 EP24
Source: IMF’s Human Resources Department.
Box 9
1. (EP3, D12) (EP3, D11)
(EP5, D11) (EP5, D12)
2. (EP10, D13) (EP10, D11)
(EP18, D11) (EP18, D13)
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choice instead of being assigned to a department not even on his preference list. At the same
time, none of the others are worse off than before.
Conclusion
We  have shown that HRD’s match of incoming EPs to departments was neither stable nor
Pareto efficient. Application of EP-Match followed by a critical assessment of all suspect pairs
would have resulted in a better outcome.
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